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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The

State

timely

appealed

from

the

district

court's

order

granting

Mr. Villavicencio's motion to correct an illegal sentence and the district court's Corrected

Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation.

On appeal, Mr. Villavicencio

argues that the district court imposed a ten year period of probation when it was only
statutorily authorized to impose a seven year period of probation. Since this error was
discovered approximately eight months after Mr. Villavicencio's period of probation
expired, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case at that time. It
follows that the district court was required to grant Mr. Villavicencio's motion to correct
an illegal sentence and enter its Corrected Order Suspending Sentence and Order of
Probation.

The State completely ignored the jurisdictional issue, which was raised

below. Instead, it argues that the district court's error can be overlooked and this matter
can be remanded for resentencing because there was a legal means to impose a ten
year period of probation when Mr. Villavicencio was initially placed on probation. The
State's position is untenable because the district court's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction functions as an absolute bar to the relief requested by the State.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
A police officer responded to a "possible mental subject" at a private residence.
(R., p.12.) Upon arrival, the police officer contacted Mr. Villavicencio who made some

incoherent statements and tried to hide what the police officer described as a small
plastic baggy containing a crystalline substance.

(R., pp.12-13.)

The police officer

arrested Mr. Villavicencio and a subsequent field test indicated that the crystalline
substance was methamphetamine. (R., p.13.)
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Mr. Villavicencio was charged, by Information, with possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.25-26.)
At this time, Mr. Villavicencio had pending charges against him in CR 2004-2777 and
CR 2005-2259.

(R., p.29.)

Pursuant to a binding global I.C.R. 11 plea agreement,

Mr. Villavicencio pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, in this matter,
and possession of a controlled substance in CR 2004-2777. (R., pp.29-31.) In return,
the State dismissed CR 2005-2259.

(R., pp.29-31.) The parties also agreed to two

consecutive unified sentences of five years, with one and one-half years fixed, a period
of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter,

Rider), and,

in the event Mr. Villavicencio

successfully completed his Rider, a "supervised probation for a period of ten ( 10)
years."

(R., p.45.)

After accepting the I.C.R. 11 plea agreement, the district court

imposed two concurrent/consecutive 1 unified sentences of five years, with one and onehalf years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.35, 42.)

On March 6, 2006, the

district court suspended the sentences and placed Mr. Villavicencio on two concurrent
ten year periods of probation. (R., pp.54-61; Respondent's Brief, p.4.)
On November 15, 2013, approximately seven years and eight months after
Mr. Villavicencio was placed on probation, the State filed a motion for warrant for
probation violation alleging that Mr. Villavicencio violated the terms of his probation.
(R., pp.131-134.)

Mr. Villavicencio filed an I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal

sentence, arguing that his ten year period of probation was illegal because the district
court could not order a period of probation which exceeded seven years. In support of

1

According to the minutes of the sentencing hearing, the district court orally
pronounced that Mr. Villavicencio sentences "are concurrent" (R., p.35; 03/06/06
Tr., p.10, Ls.13-15), but the written judgment ordered the sentences to run
consecutively. (R., p.42.)
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his motion, Mr. Villavicencio pointed out that he pleaded guilty to possession of a
controlled substance pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1 ), which authorized the district court

to impose a maximum sentence of seven years.

(R., p.209.)

Mr. Villavicencio then

argued that I.C. § 19-2601 (7) provides that a period of probation cannot exceed "the

maximum period for which the defendant might have been imprisoned." (R., p.209.)
Since the maximum period of probation cannot exceed the maximum sentence the
district court could impose, the maximum period of probation the district court was
statutorily authorized to impose was a seven year period of probation. (R., p.209.)
The State objected to Mr. Villavicencio's illegal sentence motion and asserted
that the district court mistakenly used the word concurrent when it meant that the
probationary terms were to be served consecutive to each other. (R., p.216.) The State
then argued that Mr. Villavicencio waived his ability to file the illegal sentence motion
because he entered a binding plea agreement and was bound by the agreed ten year
period of probation.

(R., pp.216-218.)

Alternatively, the State argued that even if

Mr. Villavicencio's "rights were violated," the district court should deny his motion based
on the doctrine of invited error. (R., pp.218-219.)
Mr. Villavicencio responded to the State's objection, and argued, based on

State v. Kesling, 155 Idaho 673 (Ct. App. 2013), that the district court lost subject matter
jurisdiction over this case on March 6, 2013, because the State filed its motion to revoke
probation after the expiration of the statutorily authorized seven year period of
probation. (R., pp.240-242.) Mr. Villavicencio then argued that the terms of the plea
agreement were irrelevant because the only action the district court could take was to
dismiss this proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (R., pp.240-242.)
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A hearing was held on the motion, and the State argued that the district court
could have legally imposed a ten year period of probation by ordering two consecutive
five year periods of probation in each case. (05/05/14 Tr., p.3, L.19 - p.4, L.9.) The
district court2 ruled that it orally pronounced two concurrent ten year periods of
probation, which was also reflected in the written order. (05/05/14 Tr., p.6, L.17 - p.7,
L.19.)

The district court implicitly ruled, based on Kesling, that Mr. Villavicencio's

statutorily authorized period of probation expired on March 6, 2013, which was
approximately eight months before the State filed its motion to revoke probation.
(05/05/14 Tr., p.7, L.20 - p.8, L.2.) The district court then ruled, based on State v. Allen,
144 Idaho 875 (Ct. App. 2007), that it was bound by the period of probation which was
originally pronounced at the rider review hearing and it had no authority to enter an
amended judgment which would correct appeared to be a mistake, i.e. the two ten
concurrent ten year periods of probation.

(05/05/14 Tr., p.8, L.3 - p.9, L.19.)

The

district court granted Mr. Villavicencio's I.C.R. 35(a) motion and entered a Corrected
Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation, which ordered Mr. Villavicencio to
serve a seven year period of probation which expired at midnight on March 5, 2013.
(R., pp.249-259.) Mr. Villavicencio timely appealed. (R., pp.262-264.)

Judge Wetherell presided over the rider review hearing (R., p.54), and Judge Norton
presided over the hearing on Mr. Villavicencio's illegal sentence motion. (R., p.248.)

2

4

ISSUE
Did the district court correctly determine that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
reformulate Mr. Villavicencio's period of probation?
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ARGUMENT

The District Court Correctly Determined That It Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction To
Reformulate Mr. Villavicencio's Period Of Probation

A

Introduction
Mr. Villavicencio argues that the district court correctly granted his motion to

correct an illegal sentence because his ten year period of probation was illegal, as the
maximum period of probation which can be ordered for a violation of I.C. § 372732(c)(1) is seven years. The State argues that the plea agreement was for a ten year
period of probation and that the district court could have legally structured this period of
probation by ordering two consecutive five year periods of probation in this case and in
CR 2004-777. The State then requests that this case be remanded for resentencing
"consistent with the parties' binding Rule 11 plea agreement." Contrary fo the State's
position, the district court lost subject matter jurisdiction over this case on March 6,
2013, and, therefore, has no legal authority to restructure Mr. Villavicencio's period of
probation.

As such, the district court did not err when it granted Mr. Villavicencio's

motion to correct an illegal sentence and entered its Corrected Order Suspending
Sentence and Order of Probation.

B.

Standard Of Review
Subject matter jurisdiction "may be raised at any time, including for the first time

on appeal." State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227 (2004 ).

"Issues about the district

court's jurisdiction are issues of law, over which [Idaho appellate courts] exercise
independent review." Id.

6

C.

The District Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction Which Precluded It From
Reformulating Mr. Villavicencio's Period Of Probation
An I.C.R. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence enables courts to address

subject matter jurisdiction.

State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 839-840 (2011 ).

"Subject

matter jurisdiction has been defined as the power to hear and determine cases."
Rogers, 140 Idaho at 227. "Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial

court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment
becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment
on appeal." State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352 (2003).
Subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental and parties to an action cannot waive
subject matter jurisdiction.

Rogers, 140 Idaho at 227.

Moreover, "parties cannot

consent to the court's assumption of jurisdiction through conduct or acquiescence nor
be estopped from asserting its absence."
County, 119 Idaho 121, 125 (1990).

Fairway Development Co. v. Bannock

"[S]ubject matter jurisdiction does not depend ...

on the correctness of any decision made by the court."

Rogers, 140 Idaho at 227.

(citing 20 AM. JUR.2d Courts§ 70 (1995)).
The district court's subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Villavicencio's case
expired on March 6, 2013, approximately eight months before the State filed its motion
to revoke probation.

The relevant portion of I.C. 19-2601 (7) provides, "Under a

conviction or plea of guilty for a felony the period of probation may be for a period of not
more than the maximum period for which the defendant might have been imprisoned."
I.C. § 19-2601 (1 ); see also I.C. § 20-222(1) ("The period of probation or suspension of
sentence shall be fixed by the court . . . .

Such period . . . shall not exceed the

maximum period for which the defendant might have been imprisoned.").
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Mr. Villavicencio was convicted under I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) (R., pp.25-26, 40), the
relevant portions of which provides, "Any person who violates this subsection and has in
his possession a controlled substance classified in schedule I ... is guilty of a felony
and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than seven (7) years, or fined not
more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or both." I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) (emphasis
added). Since the maximum sentence Mr. Villavicencio could receive for a violation of
I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1 ), was seven years, the maximum period of probation the district
court could impose in this matter was seven years.

Moreover, this position was

conceded by the State, the district court "placed [Mr. Villavicencio] on concurrent
probations, each for a period of ten years." (Respondent's Brief, p.4 (citing R., pp.97103) (original emphasis).)

"The sentence, as constructed by the district court, was

therefore illegal and needed to be corrected." (Respondent's Brief, p.4.)
The district court correctly granted Mr. Villavicencio's motion to correct an illegal
sentence and entered its Corrected Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation
because district court's subject matter jurisdiction over this matter expired on March 6,
2013.

Support for Mr. Villavicencio's position can be found in State v. Kesling, 155

Idaho 673 (Ct. App. 2013). 3 In that case, Kesling was convicted for three offenses, to
wit; forgery, grand theft by deception, and issuing a check without funds. Id. at 675.

During the trial proceedings, Mr. Villavicencio cited to Kesling and argued that the
district court lost subject matter jurisdiction over this case on March 6, 2013.
(R., pp.238-242.) The district court also addressed the Kesling holding at the hearing
on Mr. Villavicencio's motion to correct an illegal sentence. (05/05/14 Tr., p.7, L.20 p.8, L.2.) In the Respondent's Brief, the State failed to address either Kesling or subject
matter jurisdiction. (See generally Respondent's Brief.) As such, the State has waived
any argument as to the Kesling holding or the district court's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See Martin v. Smith, 154 Idaho 161, 164 (2013) ("An assignment of error is
deemed waived, and will not be discussed if there is no argument contained in the
appellant's brief."). Accordingly, this Court should not address any arguments the State
may proffer in its Reply Brief as to either Kesling or subject matter jurisdiction.
3
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The district court imposed three concurrent unified sentences of nine years, with two
years fixed, but suspended the sentences and placed Kesling on three concurrent nine
year periods of probation. Id.
Through an interstate compact, Kesling transferred his probation to Florida. Id.
Approximately five years after he was placed on probation, Kesling admitted to Florida
authorities that he committed five new offenses. Id. These new offenses also served
as the bases for probation violations in his Idaho cases.

Id.

After Mr. Kesling

completed his sentences in Florida, he was transferred to Idaho to answer for his
probation violations.

Id. While in Idaho, Mr. Kesling filed an I.C.R. 35(a) motion and

argued that his nine year sentence for issuing a check without sufficient funds was
illegal because the maximum sentence the district court could impose for that offense
was three years. Id. This motion was granted by the trial court. Id. Mr. Kesling also
filed an I.C.R. 35(c) motion for credit for time served, which was denied by the district
court. Id. Mr. Kesling appealed, to challenge the denial of his request for credit for time
served. Id.
For the first time on appeal, Kesling argued that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the issuing a check without sufficient funds offense because his
probation for that offense expired before the State moved to revoke his probation. Id. at
864. Specifically, he argued that the maximum period of probation that the trial court
was statutorily authorized to impose was three years because the maximum sentence
he could receive for that offense was three years. Id. The Court of Appeals agreed and
held that the fact the district court ordered a nine year period of probation was
immaterial because the maximum period of probation the district court was statutorily
authorized was three years. Id. 865. Since the State moved the district court to revoke

9

probation approximately two years after Kesling's statutorily authorized period of
probation expired, the Court of Appeals also held that, "the failure to commence
proceedings within the imposed probation term deprives the court of subject matter
jurisdiction." Id. The Court of Appeals then held:
Idaho statutes limit the term of probation that may be imposed by a court.
Probation terms that exceed the statutory maximum violate the statutes.
Therefore, the statutes do not confer jurisdiction for a court to take any
action after the maximum authorized probation period. Accordingly, the
district court here had no jurisdiction to revoke Kesling's probation in Ada
County Case No. H0300379 because the maximum lawful period of
probation had expired. Therefore, the order revoking probation and
executing the sentence in that case must be reversed.
Id.

This case is virtually indistinguishable from Kesling. In this case and in Kesling,
the periods of probation ordered by the district courts exceeded the maximum periods of
probation authorized under the respective statutes. In both cases, these errors were
not noticed until the statutorily authorized periods of probation expired and the State
moved to revoke probation after the statutorily authorized periods of probation expired.
As such, Kesling is controlling authority and the district court correctly granted
Mr. Villavicencio's motion to correct an illegal sentence because the district court did not
have jurisdiction to take any other action in this matter.
As mentioned above, the State neither cites to Kesling nor addresses the
jurisdictional argument advanced by Mr. Villavicencio before the district court. Instead,
the State argues that Mr. Villavicencio agreed to a ten year period of probation when he
entered a binding plea agreement and, since there was a way to legally order a ten year
period of probation when the district court placed him on probation, the proper remedy
is to remand this matter so the district court can implement the period of probation
provided

for

in

the

plea

agreement.

(Respondent's
10

Brief,

pp.7-10.)

The

State's position is fundamentally flawed because the district court no longer has subject
matter jurisdiction over this case.

As mentioned above, subject matter jurisdiction

cannot be waived by parties in litigation. Rogers, 140 Idaho at 227. Moreover, "subject
matter jurisdiction does not depend ... on the correctness of any decision made by the
court." Id. It follows, that the district court's error when imposing a ten year period of
probation in this case does not extend the district court's subject matter jurisdiction over
a case.

The State also argues that Mr. Villavicencio cannot benefit from a plea
agreement and then disclaim aspects of the agreement which favor the State.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) While that might be the general rule, it is not applicable in
this case, because the district court lacked jurisdiction over this matter when the
mistake was discovered. Support for this position can be found in State v. Armstrong,
146 Idaho 372 (Ct. App. 2008). In that case, Armstrong was charged with lewd conduct
with a minor under the age of sixteen and Armstrong pleaded guilty to a reduced charge
of felony injury to a child. Id. at 373. As one of the terms of the plea agreement, the
State agreed that it would not request a psychosexual evaluation.

Id.

Thereafter,

Armstrong was placed on probation. Id.
After a period of probation, Armstrong's probation officer requested that
Armstrong participate in a psychosexual evaluation.

Id.

Armstrong refused to

participate in a psychosexual evaluation and, due to that refusal, the State moved to
revoke his probation. Id. Armstrong argued that this violated the plea agreement and
requested either specific performance or, alternatively, that he be allowed to withdraw
his guilty plea. Id.

The State withdrew the probation violation and, in the event the

district court found a breach of the plea agreement, it indicated that it would not object
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to the withdrawal of Armstrong's guilty plea and the reinstatement of the lewd conduct
charge.

Id.

The district court found that the State had not breached the plea

agreement, "but that 'in fairness' Armstrong would be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea
if he wished to do so." Id. Mr. Armstrong withdrew his guilty plea. Id.
Another binding plea agreement was reached and Armstrong pleaded guilty to an
amended charge of infamous crime against nature. Id. The agreement also included a
unified sentence of six years, with one year fixed, and a four year period of probation, in
the event Armstrong successfully completed a rider.

Id.

Armstrong successfully

completed his rider and the district court placed him on a five year period of probation.
Id.

Armstrong timely appealed and argued that the five year period of probation
violated his binding plea agreement. Id. On appeal, the State argued that the district
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to allow Armstrong to withdraw his initial
guilty plea to felony injury to a child. Id. The Court of Appeals agreed and held, based
on State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352 (2003), that the district court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction to allow Armstrong to withdraw his guilty plea because his judgment
was final at the time he withdrew his guilty plea. Id. at 377-378. The Court of Appeals'
holding follows:
The Jakoski holding, that a trial court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to grant a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea after the
judgment of conviction becomes final, carries the attendant consequences
discussed above, including the consequence that the validity of the order
may be challenged at any time. In this case, it includes voiding all of the
district court proceedings that followed in the months after the court
granted Armstrong's untimely motion to withdraw his initial guilty plea
because all of those proceedings occurred without subject matter
jurisdiction. In view of the Supreme Court's explicit holding that subject
matter jurisdiction is absent in this circumstance, if such consequences
are not to attach, that clarification must come from our Supreme Court.

12

When Armstrong moved to withdraw his guilty plea to felony injury
to children, the time for appeal from the judgment of conviction had
expired and no appeal was pending. Therefore, under Jakoski, the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the motion. Accordingly,
Armstrong's plea of guilty to felony injury to children and the judgment of
conviction entered upon that guilty plea, including the sentence imposed,
are reinstated. This disposition renders moot the issue raised by
Armstrong in this appeal.
Id. at 378.
Armstrong is instructive in this matter because the State agreed that Armstrong

could withdraw his guilty plea because the binding plea agreement was potentially
breached when Armstrong's probation officer demanded that he participate in a
psychosexual

evaluation.

In

this

case,

the

State

functionally

asserts

that

Mr. Villavicencio should be estopped from challenging the length of his probation

because he agreed to a ten year period of probation.

However, "[P]arties cannot

consent to the court's assumption of jurisdiction through conduct or acquiescence nor
be estopped from asserting its absence." Armstrong, 146 Idaho at 733 (citing Fairway
Development Co, 119 Idaho at 125) (emphasis added). This principle is illustrated in
Armstrong, as Armstrong negotiated a binding plea agreement which the State arguable

breached when it required Armstrong to participate in a psychosexual evaluation. Even
though the State received a benefit from the plea agreement and Armstrong lost one of
his benefits from the plea agreement, he could not withdraw his guilty plea due to the
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In this case, the district court's error was discovered
after the district court lost subject matter jurisdiction and, due to that procedural
development, the district court cannot reformulate the period of probation it originally
ordered.
As a final note, the State was not without a remedy in this matter as it had seven
years to discover this error and request an appropriate remedy. The State could have
13

corrected the perceived error at the rider review hearing. The State could have filed an
appeal from the initial order placing Mr. Villavicencio on probation. The State had seven
years to file an I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence.

The State is not

entitled to the relief it has requested on appeal because it did not take any of these
actions prior to the expiration of the district court's subject matter jurisdiction.
In sum, the State concedes that the district court imposed a ten year period of
probation when it was only statutorily authorized to impose a seven year period of
probation.

By omission, the State concedes this error was discovered after the

statutorily authorized seven year period of probation expired. In Kesling, the Court of
Appeals held that a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction also expires when the
statutorily authorized period of probation expires, even if the trial court erroneously
orders a period of probation which exceeds the statutorily authorized period of
probation. As such, the district court lost jurisdiction over this matter on March 6, 2013,
and the State has failed to provide any argument or authority which would extend the
district court's jurisdiction past that date.

Moreover, this was argued below and the

State waived any argument as to this issue when it failed to address jurisdiction in the
Appellant's Brief.

However, the State now argues that the district court should be

ordered to reformulate Mr. Villavicencio's period of probation in a manner consistent
with the plea agreement. This course of action is not possible because the district court
does not have jurisdiction over this matter. Since this is a jurisdictional issue, it is an
absolute bar to the relief requested by the State. Accordingly, the district court did not
err when it granted Mr. Villavicencio's motion to correct an illegal sentence and entered
its Corrected Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Villavicencio respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order granting his motion to correct an illegal sentence and the district court's Corrected
Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation.

DATED this 13th day of February, 2015.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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